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Abstract In this article, I outline various ways in which artifacts are interwoven
with autobiographical memory systems and conceptualize what this implies for the
self. I first sketch the narrative approach to the self, arguing that who we are as
persons is essentially our (unfolding) life story, which, in turn, determines our
present beliefs and desires, but also directs our future goals and actions. I then argue
that our autobiographical memory is partly anchored in our embodied interactions
with an ecology of artifacts in our environment. Lifelogs, photos, videos, journals,
diaries, souvenirs, jewelry, books, works of art, and many other meaningful objects
trigger and sometimes constitute emotionally laden autobiographical memories.
Autobiographical memory is thus distributed across embodied agents and various
environmental structures. To defend this claim, I draw on and integrate distributed
cognition theory and empirical research in human-technology interaction. Based on
this, I conclude that the self is neither defined by psychological states realized by the
brain nor by biological states realized by the organism, but should be seen as a
distributed and relational construct.
Keywords Autobiographical memory  Self  Narrative  Extended mind 
Distributed cognition  Evocative objects  Transactive memory  Extended emotion
1 Introduction
In his book, The Principles of Psychology, William James (1890) argues that the
human self is partly constituted by objects and other people. He writes:
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A man’s Self is the sum of all that he can call his, not only his body and his
psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his
ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands, and yacht and bank-
account. All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper,
he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down, not
necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but in much the same way for all
(1890, p. 291–292).
James thus argues that not only our embodiment and cognitive capacities, but also
objects and other people are constitutive of the self because they cause emotions. In
this essay, I advance a new perspective on this claim by developing the following
argument. First, I argue that the self is essentially a narrative construct realized by
autobiographical memory systems. Further, as James and more recently Richard
Menary (2008) remind us, we construct our self-narratives out of embodied
experiences. In this article, I extend Menary’s view by arguing that not just our
embodiment but also our embodied interactions with external artifacts and other
persons are important for the narrative we develop. In other words, our narratives
are embodied and distributed. Specifically, I argue that evocative objects (i.e.,
objects that are connected to past personal experiences) trigger and sometimes
constitute emotionally-laden autobiographical memories. Based on these premises, I
conclude that the self is partly constituted by the web of evocative objects in our
lifeworld. I call this the distributed self view (Heersmink 2016). It provides an
important alternative to traditional psychological (continuity) views (e.g., Shoe-
maker 1984) and animalist views of the self (e.g., Olson 1997), but at the same time
recognizes that memory and embodiment are essential to selfhood.
The argument unfolds as follows. In Sect. 2, I outline the narrative approach to
personal identity, mainly building on the work of Marya Schechtman. Her neo-
Lockean view on personal identity emphasizes narrative as an important criterion of
persistence of selfhood over time. On this view, a narrative is a subjective and
personal story with of a series of connected events and experiences that are
(essential to) the person. In Sect. 3, I analyze various ways in which artifacts
transform and are interwoven with autobiographical memory systems. I do so by
drawing on and integrating distributed cognition theory and empirical research on
human-technology interaction. In Sect. 4, I conceptualize the implications of
distributed autobiographical memory for the self. I argue that artifacts but also other
people often afford continuity for our personal identity by providing a stable ecology
of memory cues in our environment. Who we are as persons or selves thus depends
on and is partly constituted by a distributed network of environmental structures.
2 The narrative self
In metaphysics, philosophers typically focus on necessary conditions for selfhood
such as consciousness, self-awareness, cognitive agency, emotional capacities, and
embodiment. So, to be a self or person, these conditions must be sufficiently
satisfied. However, for the persistence of the self over time, other conditions must
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be satisfied. This section outlines the narrative view as an approach to the
persistence of the self (Schechtman 1996).
In his book, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke defines a
person as ‘‘a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places’’
(1979, p. 335). On this definition, persons thus have certain cognitive and self-
reflective capacities, but note that for Locke, persons are also persistent over time.
This persistence does not depend on an immaterial soul or a material body, but on
the continuation of consciousness. Locke writes: ‘‘Self is that conscious thinking
thing (…), which is sensible, or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of
happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself as far as that consciousness
extends’’ (Locke 1979, p. 341). So, I am my past self only when my consciousness
extends back to that past self. Conversely, when my consciousness does not extend
back to that past self, then I am not that person, in which case there is no continuity
of self. It is not entirely clear what Locke precisely means with consciousness
extending back into the past, but it is usually interpreted as involving memory. So, I
need to have specific memories of past experiences to be that past self who had
those experiences. This view seems intuitively quite plausible, but has some
undesirable consequences. Schechtman (2005) points out that it is both too weak
and too strong. Consider a neurosurgeon implanting false memories into some
person. Those implanted memories have clearly not been experienced by the person
in question, but are on a Lockean view nonetheless seen as part of the person.
Conversely, it also implies that experiences I did have, but, for whatever reason,
cannot remember are not part of my self. Critics of Locke find these consequences
unacceptable.
Neo-Lockean views try to improve Locke’s original insight. To deal with
implanted memories, psychological continuity theorists argue that autobiographical
memories must not only be remembered but also be caused by the actual experience.
So, a causal connection between experience and the content of the memory is
necessary for the memory to be part of one’s autobiographical memories. To deal
with experiences I had but cannot remember, psychological continuity theorists
argue that overlapping chains of memories are sufficient to establish continuity. So,
for example, I may not remember the experiences I had when I was in elementary
school, but when I was in high school, I did remember most of my elementary-
school-experiences, when I was in university I remembered being a high school
student, and so on. There may thus not be many direct memory connections to my
deep past, but, such theorists claim, there are sufficient overlapping chains of
memory to establish persistency of self over time. Furthermore, it is not just
memory that is important for persistence of the self over time. The continuation of
our beliefs, desires, values, and the connections between intentions and the actions
performed at some latter time that realise those earlier intentions are also important
for persistency of self over time (Schechtman 2005).
A drawback of Neo-Lockean views is that they conceptualize autobiographical
memory as a storehouse or archive where specific episodes are stored and retrieved
at some later point in their original format and content. Schechtman (1994) and Jens
Brockmeier (2015) argue that human biological memory does not work like that.
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We do not have many discrete and detailed copies of past events in our long-term
autobiographical memory. Our memory is not like a film we can play back and
watch in detail. We do, of course, have specific memories of past experiences, but
they are typically neither discrete nor detailed. Most of our memories only contain
the general gist of an event. We may, for instance, remember that we went to our
PhD graduation ceremony and may have consolidated a few specific visual images
and emotions of the event, but we certainly do not remember the entire event in
detail. Schechtman’s (1994) point is not that we do not have specific memories.
Rather, we also create an overall narrative of our important life-experiences,
implying that autobiographical memory is integrative and holistic rather than
discrete and atomistic. Narrative theories of personal identity thus claim that
autobiographical memories are integrated into a narrative structure, implying that
our autobiography plays an important role in who we are. We summarize and
condense important memories into a story about ourselves. Given the large amount
of information that is constantly coming in, it makes sense to distill the self-relevant
information and integrate that into a narrative structure. This is so because we have
a strong human need for coherence of our temporal existence. Narratives provide
this coherence.
What exactly is a self-narrative? Building on Hilde Lindemann (2001), Amy
Kind (2015) outlines four properties that characterize a narrative structure. First,
they are dynamic depictions of a series of past events. The events are usually, but
not necessarily, depicted in chronological order. Second, the depicted events
building up the narrative are chosen selectively. Someone’s self-narrative is not a
literal depiction of all past events, but can only contain a selection of representative
and self-defining events. Third, a narrative is a subjective interpretation of a series
of events, usually from a first-person perspective. Given that human interpretation is
indeed subjective, narratives are not always depicting events as they happened. Two
persons may, for example, have different interpretations of the same event. Fourth, a
narrative is connective. The events and experiences that are the building blocks of
the narrative are connected not just temporally but also causally. This is usually
referred to as emplotment, where meaningful relations between memories are made.
Typically, this occurs through the agency of the person who is creating the narrative.
The degree of agency over the contents of the narrative are limited. Events and
experiences sometimes happen to us. Most humans do not have a great deal of
control over events in their environment and so also have limited control over the
content of their narrative. They do, however, have control over shaping the relations
between the memories. In sum, a self-narrative is a subjective and personal story
with of a series of connected events and experiences that are (essential to) the
person.
Finally, it is not just the web of autobiographical memories that are relevant for
the self. A narrative is seen by the person as part of an unfolding trajectory of which
the person is largely (or perhaps only partly) the author. The present situation
logically follows from past events and is used to anticipate the future. Who we are
as persons is not only constituted by the past but also by being future-orientated.
Our goals about the future deeply shape who we are in the present. ‘‘The past should
not only be remembered; it should help to explain the present, which in turn should
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help to predict the future’’ (Schechtman 2005, p. 20). So, a narrative not only gives
structure and coherence, but also directedness to one’s self. New experiences are
interpreted against the background of the self-narrative which gives those
experiences meaning. I am largely in agreement with Schechtman’s narrative self
view, but one drawback is that it does not consider the role of emotions. A narrative
is not a mere objective, neutral description of a series of connected events and
experiences. Rather, the autobiographical memories that build up the narrative often
have an emotional component. So, to have a fuller picture of the relation between
memory and self, we must also take into account emotions. Below I explore how
objects trigger and sometimes constitute emotionally-laden autobiographical
memories.
3 Situated cognition
Having outlined the narrative approach to the self, the next step in the argument is to
make clear that autobiographical memory is often scaffolded by and interwoven
with artifacts and other persons. I do so by drawing on situated cognition theory,
which is a cluster of views, emphasizing the embodied, embedded, extended,
distributed, and transactive nature of cognition (Robbins and Aydede 2008).
Although some situated cognition theorists take these as a package deal, there are
some important differences between these views. Two key differences are (1) the
size and type of components of the unit of analysis and (2) whether cognition is
merely embedded or genuinely extended and distributed.
Some theorists focus on systems comprising of a single embodied agent
interacting with an artifact, for example Otto (a man with Alzheimer’s disease)
using a notebook to complement his deteriorating biological memory (Clark and
Chalmers 1998). Others focus on larger systems comprising of various embodied
agents interacting with several artifacts, for example a team of navigators on a ship
interacting with navigational instruments (Hutchins 1995a) or pilots interacting with
cockpit equipment (Hutchins 1995b). Yet others focus on systems comprising of
embodied agents without using artifacts such as dyads (Wegner 1986; Sutton et al.
2010) or larger groups (Theiner 2013). The size of the unit of analysis and the
amount and type of components involved in the larger situated cognitive system has
methodological implications. Generally, the larger the system, the more effort it
takes to observe and study. Small-scale systems can be observed both in the
laboratory and in the wild. Large-scale systems are typically only observed in the
wild and thus require ethnographic methods.
Some philosophers claim that the relations between the components in situated
cognitive systems are merely causal (Adams and Aizawa 2001; Rupert 2004),
whereas others argue that these relations are constitutive (Clark and Chalmers 1998,
Hutchins 1995a, b; Menary 2007; Sutton 2010; Wheeler 2011). The constitutive
claim is ontologically much more demanding than the causal claim and has
generated substantial debate. In Sect. 3.2, I get back to the embedded versus
extended debate in relation to autobiographical memory and present a practical
solution to the problem. Despite their conceptual and methodological differences,
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what all these approaches have in common is that they focus on our embodied
interactions with the social and material environment, in that way providing an
important alternative to neurocentric and individualist views on cognition. Thus, to
better understand cognition and memory, we should enlarge the unit of analysis and
take an interactionist approach.
3.1 Situated memory
Artifacts scaffold, transform, and are interwoven with human biological memory
systems (Michaelian and Sutton 2013). The paradigm cases in situated cognition
theory mainly focus on the way artifacts scaffold working memory, prospective
memory, and semantic memory. Examples include remembering with a knotted
cord (Rowlands 1999), making a calculation with pen and paper (McClelland et al.
1986; Clark 1989), Otto’s and his notebook (Clark and Chalmers 1998), navigating
with a map or GPS system (Rowlands 2010), bartenders ordering drink glasses
(Beach 1988), and pilots interacting with cockpit equipment (Hutchins 1995b). In
these examples, information is usually first offloaded onto an artifact and then used
to scaffold some practical cognitive task involving memory. Scaffolded autobio-
graphical remembering seems to be largely ignored in the situated cognition
literature. By contrast, autobiographical memory does play a large role in
transactive memory theory (Wegner 1986; Sutton et al. 2010; Theiner 2013).
However, transactive memory theory typically does not focus on artifacts, but on
socially distributed memory in dyads or larger social groups. The relation between
autobiographical memory and artifacts is thus underexplored in situated cognition
theory. One of the goals of this article is to further explore this relation by
introducing empirical research on human-technology interaction to situated
cognition theory.
Before moving on to outlining various ways artifacts scaffold autobiographical
memory, let me first briefly describe how transactive memory works. Autobio-
graphical remembering often takes place in transactive memory systems. In such
transactive systems, memory is socially distributed across the members of a group
(Sutton et al. 2010). Celia Harris et al. (2010) describe a striking example of how
transactive memory works. A long-married couple tries to recall the name of the
show they saw on their honeymoon more than 40 years ago. Neither of them
initially knows the name of the show, but by interactively cuing, they construct the
answer together. Memory here is an emergent property that cannot be reduced to its
individual constituents.
Wife: And we went to two shows, can you remember what they were called?
Husband: We did. One was a musical, or were they both? I don’t… no… one…
Wife: John Hanson was in it
Husband: Desert Song
Wife: Desert Song, that’s it, I couldn’t remember what it was called, but yes, I
knew John Hanson was in it
Husband: Yes
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Autobiographical remembering often takes place not just in dyads, but also in
families, sports teams, a group of colleagues, and a group of friends, because
members of such groups often have many shared experiences. Artifacts, too, play an
important role in autobiographical memory (van Dijck 2007; van den Hoven 2014).
Personal objects such as souvenirs, clothing, furniture, CDs, DVDs, books, letters,
musical instruments, works of art, and various other objects are often connected to
specific personal experiences or specific episodes from one’s past. Sherry Turkle
refers to such objects as evocative objects, which, she writes, are typically
‘‘experienced as part of the self, and for that reason have a special status’’ (2007,
p. 7). Turkle’s (2007) edited book contains short personal stories of designers,
researchers, and artists who reflect upon their favorite evocative object. Examples
include a cello, ballet slippers, a laptop, a silver pin, a suitcase, a painting, an old
analogue camera, a car, and various other artifacts.
In virtue of which informational properties can such objects connect us to our
past? To better understand the causally relevant informational properties of
evocative objects, it is helpful to start by introducing a distinction between three
types of representations, namely, icons, indices, and symbols (Peirce 1935). Icons
such as photos, videos, or drawings display a relevant isomorphism to their target.
Indices such as thermometers and scales have a direct causal connection to what
they represent. If the target system changes, say, temperature, then the index
automatically changes as well. Symbols such as words and numbers obtain their
representational function through shared use, social agreement, and logical rules.
Some evocative objects clearly have representational properties; for example,
photos or videos of important (life) events, journal entries, letters, and drawings. But
evocative objects need not exhibit iconic, indexical or symbolic properties in the
Peircean sense. Souvenirs, clothing, furniture, or coffee mugs, for example, do not
exhibit presentational properties. In their empirical work on evocative objects,
Daniela Petrelli, Steve Whittaker, and Jens Brockmeier examined what types of
objects trigger autobiographical memories. They found that ‘‘Everyday objects
become mementos by virtue of what the owner has invested in them, be it time or
emotion. Thus, it is not usually the physical characteristics of the objects that make
them biographical, but the meaning imputed to them as significant personal
possessions’’ (2008, p. 56). I am sympathetic to their view, but it seems to me that
those physical non-representational properties of objects such as their shape, color,
size, and perhaps their aesthetic properties, do make them autobiographical. Only
that specific object with those properties can evoke that specific memory. Our
embodied-perceptual experiences of those properties seem highly relevant. Their
view seems individualist and perhaps gives too much credit to the internal, isolated
human mind. Compare media theorist Jose´ van Dijck when she writes: ‘‘Mediated
memories can be located neither strictly in the brain nor wholly outside in (material)
culture but exist in both concurrently, for they are complex manifestations of a
complex interaction between brain, material objects, and the cultural matrix from
which they arise’’ (van Dijck 2007, p. 28). On her view, memory is thus the result of
interactions between humans and objects, which seems a more plausible view to me
and is more consistent with the view I develop in this paper.
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Also, non-representational evocative objects potentially have different effects on
their user as compared to representational objects, because they leave more room for
interpretation. A photo or video of a past holiday exactly shows what a certain event
was like, but a souvenir of the same holiday has no isomorphism to a past event and
so provides more room to the imagination of the user. Luciano Floridi points out
that external memory as it relates to narrative identity also has limiting factors. He
writes: ‘‘The more memories we accumulate and externalise, the more narrative
constraints we provide for the construction and development of personal identities.
Increasing our memories means decreasing the degree of freedom we might enjoy in
defining ourselves’’ (2011, p. 562). But for reconstructive purposes, non-represen-
tational evocative objects provide more freedom in creating our narrative.
Furthermore, our emotional and cognitive responses to evocative objects are not
constant over time. It is not the case that an object causes the exact same response
each time we interact with it (van Dijck 2007). Memories stored in the brain are
subject to change and are reconstructed each time they are retrieved. So, over time,
our autobiographical memories (slightly) change, which implies that the cognitive
effects of evocative objects also change over time. To draw some of the previous
discussion together; I define evocative objects as physical objects or structures that
in virtue of representational or non-representational properties evoke autobiograph-
ical memories. The autobiographical function need not be the object’s primary or
intended function. A cello, for example, has as its primary function to make music,
but may have as a secondary and perhaps unintended function to remind its owner of
past experiences (Heersmink and Carter 2017).
The web of evocative objects has been referred to as an autotopography, i.e., a
topography of the self. ‘‘Just as a written autobiography is a series of narrated
events, fantasies, and identification, so too an autotopography forms a spatial
representation of important relations, emotional ties, and past events’’ (Gonzalez
1995, p. 139). An autotopography can exist in many forms and is highly
idiosyncratic. It can be ‘‘a careful, visual arrangement of mementos and heirlooms,
on the one hand, and a jumbled, hidden assembly of dusty and unkempt objects, on
the other, can both constitute a material memory landscape’’ (Gonzalez 1995,
p. 139). The notion of an autotopography is person-centered. Evocative objects can
indeed be meaningful to a single person, but they can also be embedded within a
larger transactive memory system involving more than one person. A holiday
souvenir, photo album or video, for example, may be meaningful to all the family
members who participated in that holiday. Such objects may collectively remind the
family about their shared experiences and might generate conversations about past
experiences. There are thus also grouptopographies, i.e., shared material memory
landscapes of dyads or larger groups.
New autobiographical memory technologies are now emerging referred to as
lifelogging or self-tracking technologies, allowing an agent to monitor and record a
variety of bodily, cognitive, and emotional variables. These include heart rate, body
temperature, weight, dietary intake, sleep patterns, GPS locations, but also social
interactions on the internet, emails, text messages, and allow one to take photos and
videos. Most of these variables can be recorded with a smartphone that typically
have sensors such as GPS, digital compass, gyroscope, and accelerometer. More
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advanced smart phones also have sensors to record heart rate, body temperature,
humidity, and altitude. Such advanced sensors, software, and the hundreds of self-
tracking apps allow one to create an elaborate and detailed database about one’s life,
which is often referred to as a lifelog (Smart et al. 2017). An important lifelogging
technology are SenseCams, which are small wearable cameras worn around one’s
neck. The wide-angle camera takes a picture when its internal sensors detect a
change in movement, GPS-location or light intensity, resulting in a visual narrative
of one’s daily activities. Sociologist Deborah Lupton points out that ‘‘The personal
data that are collected using self-tracking devices—photographs, videos, messages,
interactions on social media, calendar entries, geolocation information, bodily
functions and activities—become a biographical repository of significance and
meaning to the user’’ (2016, p. 72).
A striking example of lifelogging is the MyLifeBits project of Gordon Bell
developed at Microsoft. In their co-authored book, Total Recall, Bell and Jim
Gemmell write that an elaborate and detailed lifelog allows one to ‘‘become the
librarian, archivist, cartographer, and curator of your life’’ (2009, p. 5). So,
according to them, a lifelog not only gives one more control over one’s life, but also
gives one enhanced self-insight, and allows one to remember less and think more
creatively. Bell’s digital lifelog contains photos, videos, webpages, GPS-based
locations, letters, memos, receipts, legal documents, business cards, meeting
agendas, symposium programs, diplomas, employee evaluations, newspaper clip-
pings, childhood drawings, birth certificates, and much more. Based on various
metadata, he and his colleagues developed advanced software to search the lifelog,
allowing easy and effective retrieval of information. Bell has thus centralized and
digitalized his autotopography into an all-encompassing and easy accessible lifelog.
A noteworthy example he mentions is a blanked he inherited from his grandmother.
Bell says he will soon give the blanked to his son and then take a high-resolution
photo of it and upload that into his lifelog. He writes ‘‘I’ve discovered that I derive
more pleasure from them in digital form. While I’m enjoying my e-memories, most
people’s physical mementos gather dust in an attic’’ (2009, p. 138). So, a digitalized
evocative object is, on Bell’s view, more enjoyable and useful. Bell and Gemmell
predict that lifelogs ‘‘will become vital to our episodic memory. As you live your
life, your personal devices will capture whatever you decide to record. Bio-
memories fade, vanish, merge, and mutate with time, but your digital memories are
unchanging’’ (Bell and Gemmell 2009, p. 57). Their ambitious approach thus aims
to overcome the weaknesses of human biological memory.
Bell’s approach to lifelogging aims to capture as many of his daily activities as
possible, exemplified by his slogans ‘‘total recall’’ and ‘‘total capture’’. However,
from a narrative perspective on the self, total capture seems too course-grained. Our
narrative is not a complete story of all our past experiences, but only a highly
selective set of self-defining autobiographical memories integrated into a meaning-
ful story. A lifelog should support that narrative with content such as photos, videos,
descriptions, certificates, and so on. A successful example of this approach is
developed by Masashi Crete-Nishihata et al. (2012). They developed a ‘‘multimedia
biography’’ for twelve people with mild cognitive impairment or Alzheimer’s
disease. These multimedia biographies included photos, home movies, documents,
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letters, music, and narration compiled into a 15–60 min digital video representing a
person’s life story. The video has a number of acts representing life stages such as
adolescence, marriage, career, and hobbies, which are told chronologically. The
researchers show that lifelogs can have beneficial effects for autobiographical
memory and consequently also for their self. Moreover, the total capture approach
to lifelogging is motivated by the view that memory is like an archive. On such a
view, we should try to develop a complete external archive (visual or otherwise) of
our past events. However, as outlined above, human memory is not like an archive.
An archive-like view on memory is evolutionarily implausible as there is too much
information coming in and there is no need to store everything we experience in
detail. So, if one’s aim is to create a lifelog which successfully supports one’s
narrative, it should be selective.
3.2 Embedded or extended autobiographical memory?
An important question is whether evocative objects merely scaffold or are genuinely
constitutive of memory. First-wave extended mind theory, as developed by Clark
and Chalmers (1998) and Mike Wheeler (2011), focusses on course-grained
functional parity between an internal and external resource, as well as on the ‘‘trust
and glue’’ conditions of constancy, reliability, trust, and past endorsement. Thus,
only when an external resource exhibits functional parity with an internal cognitive
resource and is constantly available, reliable, trustworthy and endorsed in the past,
is the resource part of an extended cognitive system. However, functional parity
between an internal and external resource has been questioned as a criterion for
membership of an extended cognitive system (Menary 2007; Sutton 2010). In case
of memories, for example, external memories are typically static and do not show
the regency and primacy effect, whereas internal memories are automatically
updated based on new incoming information and are much more dynamic and
holistic. There are thus important functional differences between internal and
external memories.
For this reason, John Sutton (2010) has identified and articulated an alternative
route to extended cognition. This is referred to as second-wave extended mind
theory, focusing on complementarity between internal and external resources and on
the degree of integration between the two (Menary 2007; Sutton 2010). On a
complementarity view, artifacts need not exhibit similar properties as internal states
and processes, but complement the internal with different properties and functions.
Complementing brain functions is often the point of using cognitive artifacts, that is,
such that they can perform functions the brain cannot do or cannot do well. For
example, the unaided brain is good at pattern recognition and completion, but not at
visualizing complex structures in mental imagery. For this reason, scientists often
create physical or virtual models of the target system they are studying. A key
example here is Watson and Crick building a physical model of the structure of
DNA. The informational properties and affordances of the model complement the
pattern recognition and completion powers of the human brain.
Further developing complementarity-based extended mind theory, Heersmink
(2015) proposes a multidimensional framework to conceptualize the degree of
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cognitive integration between agents and artifacts (see also Wilson and Clark 2009;
Sterelny 2010; Sutton et al. 2010). These dimensions include the intensity of
information flow, accessibility of the resource, durability of the relation between
agent and artifact, trustworthiness of the information the artifact contains,
procedural transparency or ease of use, informational transparency, the degree of
individualization, and the degree of transformation. All these dimensions are
matters of degree and the higher a given agent-artifact system ranks on these
dimensions the deeper the two are integrated and the more likely it is that they form
an extended cognitive system. This framework provides a novel perspective on the
conditions of cognitive extension and offers a more practical solution to the
metaphysical question of constitution. On this view, constitution and membership to
extended cognitive systems is not seen in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions. Rather, it outlines a conceptual space in which the complexity of both
embedded and extended cognitive systems can be explored (see also Skorburg
2017). Systems ranking high on most key dimensions are typically deeply integrated
and good candidates for extended cognitive systems. Whereas systems ranking low
on most key dimensions are usually not deeply integrated and thus candidates for
embedded cognitive systems. However, it is not always easy or even possible to
clearly demarcate between the embedded and extended cases. Because relations
between agents and artifacts can vary along many dimensions and are thus quite
complex, there is a grey area in between the paradigm cases of embedded and
extended systems in which it may not always be clear whether a system is embedded
or extended.
Further, this framework is developed to conceptualize the degree of integration
between agents and artifacts when performing some practical cognitive task such as
navigating, calculating, or problem-solving. It therefore mainly describes the
functional integration between agents and artifacts. This is important because, as
Wilson and Clark point out, ‘‘the right kind of coupling (one resulting in deep
functional integration) is a major part of what determines the scope and bounds of
an agent’s cognitive apparatus’’ (2009, p. 71). In the paradigm cases of deeply
integrated cognitive systems, there is typically (though not necessarily) reciprocal
information flow between agent and artifact. This happens, for example, when
making a calculation with pen and paper, writing a text, re-arranging letter tiles
when playing Scrabble, sketching some structure, or making a PowerPoint
presentation. These are all tasks involving problem-solving to achieve some
practical goal.
However, in case of autobiographical remembering with the aid of evocative
objects, there is often no practical goal involved, other than reminiscing. Therefore,
in relation to autobiographical memory, we should add a dimension to the
framework, namely a dimension of autobiographical dependency. We often depend,
to varying degrees, on evocative objects to be able to remember some past event or
experience. If the object would not be available, then we would not think about the
past event it represents. As with the other dimensions, dependency is a matter of
degree. In some cases, we do not need the object at all to be able to have an
autobiographical memory. But in other cases—for example when an event is deeper
in our past or is perhaps less strongly consolidated—we depend more on the object
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to be able to evoke an autobiographical memory. On one extreme of this spectrum
of dependency is an Alzheimer’s patient who needs the object to be able to
remember the past. For such a patient, the object is necessary to be able to have
certain memories.
How deeply are evocative objects integrated into the autobiographical memory
systems of their users? Some evocative objects clearly are not deeply integrated into
the cognitive systems of their users. Memorabilia stored away in a box in the attic
are rarely interacted with and so rank very low on intensity of information flow,
accessibility, and transformation. They may, however, rank high on autobiograph-
ical dependency, in which case they also rank higher on overall integration. Other
evocative objects such as lifelogs rank much higher on most dimensions. They
contain a lot of biographical information, are interacted with more often, and are
used for a variety of tasks. Lifelogs seem to play a much more important role for
autobiographical memory and in the cognitive lives of their users more generally
(Clowes 2015); they therefore rank much higher on all dimensions and are therefore
much deeper integrated with the cognitive systems of their users. This is particularly
the case when the lifelog is used to compensate deteriorating memory systems.
Commenting on the effects of lifelogs for patients with Alzheimer’s disease, Crete-
Nishihata et al. (2012) write that ‘‘family members and participants perceived the
multimedia biographies as a means for preserving the personhood of their loved
one…’’ (2012, p. 101, italics added). In such cases, the dependency is very high. For
this reason, the object is deeply integrated, part of one’s autobiographical memory,
and, as Crete-Nishihata et al. point out, also part of one’s personhood (for more
discussion see Heersmink 2016).
So, some components of our autotopography are mere triggers to biomemory,
whereas other components are constitutive parts of one’s autobiographical memory
systems. It is important to note, however, that even the objects that are not deeply
integrated can still play key roles in one’s memory and self. It is conceptually useful
to better understand the causal-constitutive issue, but we should not ignore objects
that are not constitutive of memory.
3.3 Embedded or extended emotion?
The examples presented above make clear that human autobiographical memory is
scaffolded by and interwoven with a variety of artifacts and other people. I now
argue that to have a fuller picture of the relation between human cognition and
artifacts, we also need to consider how artifacts influence emotions. Emotion has
only recently received attention from situated cognition theorists (Griffiths and
Scarantino 2009; Huebner 2011; Slaby 2014; Krueger 2014; Stephan Walter and
Wilutzky 2014; Colombetti and Roberts 2015; Carter Gordon and Palermos 2016).
Traditionally, emotion is conceptualized as a purely internal and individualist
phenomenon. Most emotion theorists and psychologists focus on emotion as brain-
based affective states and processes. However, Paul Griffiths and Andrea Scarantino
point out that ‘‘Emotion is a form of skillful engagement with the social
environment that involves a dynamic process of negotiation mediated by reciprocal
feedback between emoter and interactants’’ (2009, p. 443). Griffiths and Scarantino
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focus on emotional aspects of inter-personal interactions. But, as I will argue below,
artifacts also have a strong emotional significance for humans.
Whether emotion is embedded (i.e., causal) or extended/distributed (i.e.,
constitutive) is an important question. Griffiths and Scarantino remain neutral to
this topic. They make clear that a situated approach to emotion invites us to shift the
focus from internal and individualist concepts of emotion to our embodied
interactions with both the social and material environment. So, on their view, the
payoff of a situated approach to emotion is methodological, not metaphysical. By
contrast, in an article published in this journal, Colombetti and Roberts (2015) argue
that emotions can be extended into the environment. They start with outlining the
realm of the affective, which, on their view, includes emotions, moods, sentiments,
temperaments, and certain character traits. Paradigmatic emotions include fear,
anger, sadness, hope, shame, joy, and contempt. Moods include having the blues,
being grumpy, and feeling anxious. Sentiments are tendencies to feel a variety of
different emotions. Temperaments are tendencies to have certain moods such as
being cheerful, being prickly, and being melancholic. Character traits, finally, are
dispositions to evaluate and affectively respond to events in a certain way.
Examples are being optimistic, friendly, loyal, modest, cruel, and courteous. Note
that affective states, processes and dispositions may sometimes be grouped into
more than one of those categories. These categories are neither meant to be
exhaustive nor mutually exclusive.
Drawing on Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) parity principle and ‘‘trust and glue’’
conditions, Colombetti and Roberts argue in favor of extended non-occurrent
affective states. Thus, when Eve writes in her diary that she resents her parents, that
information is ‘‘part of the supervenience base of the system that realizes her
standing, dispositional resentment towards her parents’’ (2015, p. 1253). Another
example they give is wearing the wedding ring of a deceased partner. ‘‘If sentiments
are dispositions to be attached to certain objects, including people, then the
deceased spouse’s ring in this example ought to be seen as a proper part of the
vehicles that instantiate the sentiment of love toward a specific person’’ (2015,
p. 1254). I am sympathetic to Colombetti and Roberts’ view and to the idea of
extended emotion more generally, but perhaps, in case of evocative objects like
diaries and wedding rings of deceased partners, it is not emotion in and of itself, but
emotionally-laden autobiographical memories that are extended. Peter Goldie
developed a view on memory, narrative, and emotion, arguing that emotion is in
some cases part of the content of the memory and narrative. He writes: ‘‘It is not as
though there is, first, a completed narrative, and then, second, an evaluation and
emotional response to the narrative; rather, the evaluation and emotional response
themselves infuse the narrative, shaping and colouring it’’ (Goldie, 2012 p. 11). On
Goldie’s view, it is difficult to disentangle the emotional and informational
components of memories and narratives. So, when specific autobiographical
memories with an emotional component are extended, emotion seems to be
extended as well. However, not all autobiographical memories have an emotional
component. When that is the case, emotion is not extended.
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4 Distributed narratives
In the previous section, I argued that emotionally laden autobiographical memories
are scaffolded by and interwoven with external artifacts. What are the implications
of this view for our personal identity? Menary (2008) argues that our specific
embodiment is important for the narratives we develop (for discussion see
Mackenzie 2014; Jongepier 2016; Køster 2016), in that way bringing together
embodied cognition theory and the narrative approach to the self. He writes: ‘‘Our
embodied experiences, perceptions and actions are all prior to the narrative sense of
self, indeed our narratives are structured by the sequence of embodied experiences’’
(2008, p. 75). Narrative theorists such as Schechtman have not paid a great deal of
attention to the role of embodiment for generating our narratives. Menary, however,
emphasizes that our narratives are anchored in our embodiment, that is, narratives
arise directly from our lived experience as embodied subjects. We first have
embodied experiences which we then integrate into our overall narrative. In an
important sense, the content or building blocks of our narrative are first-person
embodied experiences. On this view, we do not just have narratives but we have
embodied narratives. In this section, I want to extend Menary’s view by arguing that
not just our embodiment but also our embodied interactions with external artifacts
and other persons are important for our narrative. In other words, our narratives are
embodied and distributed.
4.1 Evocative objects and self
I start by outlining some of the empirical research on evocative objects. Petrelli
et al. (2008) conducted field studies in people’s homes in which participants gave an
interviewer a tour through their homes describing how and why particular objects
are biographically meaningful. One participant says about her mug:
I feel very emotionally attached to it for some reason. (…) I bought it in
London, when I was working in London. I think it is the memory of working
in publishing, living in London and going through a sort of fulfilling patch in
my career. (…) Also, I associate it with buying my first house. (…) So, it is an
object of continuity because I think I must have had it for… Ohh… let me
think, I probably had it for nearly 20 years (2008, p. 56).
This quote not only shows that an artifact provides connections to emotionally-
laden past events and episodes, but that it can do so for a long period, providing
long-term stable connections to past experiences. Interestingly, what Petrelli,
Whittaker and Brockmeier found is that most evocative objects relate to the recent
past, that is, the last ten years or so. The objects that do relate to the deep past, for
example childhood, are typically not placed in central locations in the home. The
researchers point out that objects refer to various aspects of the past. First,
relationships with other people; for example, a photo of someone, a gift received
from a friend, or a sculpture made during an art class that both partners attended.
Second, personal reminiscence; for example, childhood memorabilia, tools for
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hobbies such as an old camera, or objects indicating achievements such as medals,
awards, and certificates. Third, past events; for example, photos and souvenirs of
holidays. Note that these three aspects are neither meant to be exhaustive nor
mutually exclusive.
Surprisingly, objects that are most emotionally significant are often stored away
in boxes. Such boxes then function as time capsules and when rediscovered ‘‘a
whole past world is opened and the owner is thrown back in time, deeply immersed
in reminiscing’’ (Petrelli et al. 2008, p. 60). One example Petrelli and Whittaker
(2010) mention is a box given to a participant by her mother filled with personal
objects such as photos of her grandmother, her grandmother’s sewing kit, her
uncle’s wooden carvings, and other old family things. The participant says: ‘‘It is
like a little corner of a part of my life’’ (Petrelli and Whittaker 2010, p. 161).
However, the objects that participants talked about most frequently are deliberately
placed in plain view. A participant says: ‘‘The study is not a place where I would put
my memories because I rarely come in here and when I do it is because I need to
work’’ (Petrelli and Whittaker 2010, p. 161–162). The living room is thus a more
important place for evocative objects. Petrelli and Whittaker therefore distinguish
between active and passive objects. Active evocative objects are placed in
prominent and easily visible places usually in the living room, whereas passive
objects are stored away in boxes and are not often interacted with. In terms of
cognitive integration, active objects seem integrated deeper into the memories of
their users than passive objects. Reflecting on their empirical work, Petrelli and
Whittaker write ‘‘Recollecting our lives makes use of both physical and narrative
aspects: mementos mark events, while the narrative plot organises these scattered
points’’ (2010, p. 154). Their view seems exactly right to me: evocative objects and
narratives complement each other. Our embodied interactions with evocative
objects trigger and sometimes constitute emotionally-laden autobiographical
memories, which are the building blocks of our narrative. Our narrative, in turn,
helps to make sense of our autotopography. Objects and narratives are thus
interwoven. Also, evocative objects stabilize and extend autobiographical memory,
but the narrative construction is done by the agent.
Much of the empirical research has been done in people’s homes as that is where
we keep most of our evocative objects. Other places, however, may also include
evocative objects. People’s work-environments, say, an office, may contain personal
objects such as photos, drawings, mugs, books, certificates, and so on. Evocative
objects may even be in public space. Monuments, buildings, perhaps even locations
such as a park or a city square may evoke emotionally-laden autobiographical
memories. Monuments are particularly relevant as their intended function is, both to
individually and collectively, commemorate a person or event. Although it may not
always be autobiographical, monuments and the cultural practices related to them
can be relevant for one’s personal identity, but also for one’s cultural identity
(Osborne 2001). The relation between personal identity, cultural identity, and
collective memory seems a fruitful area for future exploration (Wilson and Lenart
2014). Furthermore, there is a large variety in the kinds of distributed selves. Some
people keep a lot of evocative objects, whereas others very few. Some people
interact with their evocative objects frequently, whereas others do not. Some people
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have a lifelog, whereas others do not. This may depend on age, gender, personality,
education, cognitive profile, socio-cultural background, and other variables. We all
have different autotopographies supporting different narratives. Further conceptual
and empirical research should study and map such differences.
Up to this point, the emphasis has been on artifacts and distributed selves, but
selves can also be socially distributed. Schechtman emphasizes the first-personal
nature of narratives. Self-narratives are experienced from one’s own perspective and
the person in question is typically the protagonist in the narrative. Lindemann
(2001), however, argues that third-personal narratives can play an important role in
one’s personal identity, too. She argues that how others see us can influence our
self-narrative. If, for example, other people have a negative view on some of my
capabilities, it may influence how I see those capabilities, even if the views of others
are incorrect. Lindeman’s view puts open the door to socially distributed narratives
(see also Wilson and Lenart 2014). This point can be further developed by drawing
on transactive memory theory, as some of the autobiographical memories that build
up my narrative can be stored in other people’s brains. The Desert Song example
presented in Sect. 3, shows that close partners scaffold each other’s autobiograph-
ical memory. Autobiographical memories may thus be scaffolded by objects and
other people.
4.2 Soft selves
Some situated cognition theorists argue that the human self is essentially a soft self.
Clark, for example, claims that ‘‘our best tools and technologies literally become us:
the human self emerges as a soft self, a constantly negotiable collection of resources
easily able to straddle and criss-cross the boundaries between biology and artifact’’
(2007, p 278). Clark here is mainly talking about tools that are incorporated into the
body schema, which is a subpersonal representation of the body’s size and position
in space. Subjectively, such tools are then experienced as transparent extensions of
our perceptual-motor system. Phenomenologist Don Ihde (1990) refers to this as an
embodiment relation. Ihde argues that in such cases, the technology becomes part of
the machinery that experiences the world, in that way mediating the relation
between agent and world. A key example here is a blind person using a cane to
sense the environment (Merleau-Ponty 1965). The cane withdraws from attention
and is absorbed into its user’s body schema. When that happens, there is a
‘‘symbiosis between artifact and user within human action’’ (Ihde 1990, p. 73). The
system we call an agent or person ends at the cane-environment interface, not at the
agent-cane interface. Lambros Malafouris (2008) uses this kind of reasoning to
argue for an extended self. Drawing on research in archeology, phenomenology, and
neuroscience, he argues that certain body ornaments extend the self. I agree with
Clark, Ihde, and Malafouris. I think the phenomenology of tool-use is one route to
showing that our self is fluent and open to incorporate objects. But, as I argue in this
article, I think it applies more broadly. Human selves are open as to incorporate
objects and artifacts, not just in our body schemas, but also in our autobiographical
memories and narrative selves. And, importantly, it is not just objects, but also other
people that are incorporated into our selves.
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Lynne Rudder Baker (2009) argues that if our self is a changing combination of
biological, psychological, and technological components, then there cannot be
continuity over time. However, contrary to her view, I think evocative objects can,
in some cases, provide continuity for our self. The above example of the mug that
has been kept and used for almost 20 years shows that objects can actually provide
long-term stability for autobiographical memory. And because such memories are
the building blocks of narratives, they indirectly also provide stability for our
narrative self. The narrative—especially emplotment (i.e., creating and shaping the
relations between memories) and remembering experiences—establish continuity.
The objects and memories themselves are fragments until they are given coherence
by emplotment into a narrative form. The objects themselves are scaffolding the
memories that provide the raw material for the narrative which provides the
continuity.
A critic might argue that even if we are isolated from all our objects and other
people such that there is no material and social scaffolding of memory, there
remains a core self. This self may be rather diminished and may have a much less
detailed and stable narrative, but still has a narrative. I agree with this view. My
claim in this article is neither normative (I am not saying that selves ought to be
distributed), nor is my claim metaphysical (I am not saying that selves are
necessarily distributed). Given our technological and social lifeworld, it happens
that our narratives are interwoven with objects and other people, but non-distributed
selves seem logically and metaphysically possible. Likewise, in extended mind
theory the consensus is that cognition sometimes extends (under certain conditions),
but certainly not always. We also have internally realized cognitive states and
processes.
Finally, the view developed in this paper implies that when we lose our homes
and the evocative objects in it, we lose part of our memory and identity. Daniel
Dennett therefore writes that when you take Alzheimer’s patients ‘‘out of their
homes is literally separating them from large parts of their minds’’ (Dennett 1996,
p. 138). Recently, an interesting initiative has been developed to counter this
deterioration of memory and self. The Old Town Museum in Aarhus, Denmark, has
a room with objects and furniture from the 1950s called the ‘‘House of Memories’’.
It is not open to the public but is meant for Alzheimer’s patients who live in a
daycare center nearby to help them reminisce about their past. To optimize
historical authenticity, the patients are welcomed by someone dressed in traditional
1950s Danish clothes. The patients are encouraged to interact with the objects and to
talk about their past with a caregiver. Although this won’t give such patients back
their full memory and restore their sense of self, it seems a very promising way to
help deal with loss of self through Alzheimer’s disease. It is, however, not only
Alzheimer’s patients who sometimes suffer from a diminished of sense of self
through loss of evocative objects. We all occasionally suffer from loss of objects for
all kinds of reasons, which has implications for memory, emotion, and self. Let me
end this paper by going back to the original insight of James (1890) with which this
paper began. James writes:
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Although it is true that a part of our depression at the loss of possessions is due
to our feeling that we must now go without certain goods that we expected the
possessions to bring in their train, yet in every case there remains, over and
above this, a sense of the shrinkage of our personality, a partial conversion of
ourselves to nothingness, which is a psychological phenomenon by itself
(1890, p. 293).
A loss of evocative objects can thus result in a reduction of our sense of self,
accompanied with psychological and emotional consequences. This gives such
objects a distinct ontological status, which has important normative implications. If
objects partly constitute who we are, then those objects ought not be interfered with
(Heersmink 2016). As Dennett pointed out, this seems particularly the case for
patients with memory disorders, but it applies to all of us.
5 Conclusion
Our autotopography, that is, the network of evocative objects in which we are
embedded, provides stability and continuity for our autobiographical memory and
narrative self. By interacting with these objects, we construct and reconstruct our
past and by doing so also our personal identity. Objects and narratives complement
each other. Our embodied interactions with evocative objects trigger and sometimes
constitutive emotionally-laden autobiographical memories, which are the building
blocks of our narrative. Our narrative, in turn, helps to make sense of our
autotopography. This happens individually (where objects are only meaningful to
single persons), but also collectively (where objects become part of a transactive
memory system). On my view, evocative objects stabilize and extend memory, but
the narrative construction is done by the agent. An important conclusion of this
paper is thus that our narrative is partly anchored in our embodied interactions with
an ecology of artifacts in our lifeworld. For this reason, personal identity is neither
defined by psychological states realized by the brain nor by biological states
realized by the organism, but should be seen as a distributed and relational
construct.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Elise van den Hoven for the invitation to give a talk about the
narrative self and technology at the University of Technology in Sydney. Thanks also to Wendy Carlton
for giving very helpful feedback on an earlier version of this paper, John Sutton for giving useful
suggestions for literature on autobiographical memory, and to Celia Harris for drawing my attention to the
House of Memories initiative in Denmark. Some of the ideas in this paper were presented at Minds, Selves
and 21st Century Technology held at the New University of Lisbon and at the Cognitive Humanities
workshop held at Macquarie University (both in 2016). I like to thank the organizers and the audiences for
helpful feedback and suggestions.
References
Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2001). The bounds of cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 14(1), 43–64.
Baker, L. R. (2009). Persons and the extended mind thesis. Zygon, 44(3), 642–658.
R. Heersmink
123
Beach, K. (1988). The role of external mnemonic symbols in acquiring an occupation. In M.
M. Gruneberg & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memory: Current research and issues (Vol.
1, pp. 342–346). New York: Wiley.
Bell, G. M., & Gemmell, J. (2009). Total recall: How the e-memory revolution will change everything.
New York: Dutton.
Brockmeier, J. (2015). Beyond the archive: Memory, narrative, and the autobiographical process.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carter, J. A., Gordon, E. C., & Palermos, S. O. (2016). Extended emotion. Philosophical Psychology,
29(2), 198–217.
Clark, A. (1989). Microcognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Clark, A. (2007). Re-inventing ourselves: The plasticity of embodiment, sensing, and mind. Journal of
Philosophy and Medicine, 32(3), 263–282.
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 10–23.
Clowes, R. (2015). Thinking in the cloud: The cognitive incorporation of cloud-based technology.
Philosophy & Technology, 28(2), 261–296.
Colombetti, G., & Roberts, T. (2015). Extending the extended mind: The case for extended affectivity.
Philosophical Studies, 172(5), 1243–1263.
Crete-Nishihata, M., et al. (2012). Reconstructing the past: Personal memory technologies are not just
personal and not just for memory. Human–Computer Interaction, 27(1–2), 92–123.
Dennett, D. (1996). Kinds of minds: Towards an understanding of consciousness. New York: Basic
Books.
Floridi, L. (2011). The informational nature of personal identity. Minds and Machines, 21(4), 549–566.
Goldie, P. (2012). The mess inside: Narrative, emotion, and the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gonzalez, J. (1995). Autotopographies. In G. Brahm & M. Driscoll (Eds.), Prosthetic territories: Politics
and hypertechnologies (pp. 133–150). Boulder: Westview.
Griffiths, P., & Scarantino, A. (2009). Emotions in the wild: The situated perspective on emotions. In P.
Robbins & M. Aydede (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition (pp. 437–453).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harris, C. B., Keil, P. G., Sutton, J. & Barnier, A. J. (2010). Collaborative remembering: When
canremembering with others be beneficial? In W. Christensen, E. Schier & J. Sutton (Eds.),
ASCS09: Proceedings of the 9th conference of the Australasian society for cognitive science (pp.
131–134). Sydney: Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science.
Heersmink, R. (2015). Dimensions of integration in embedded and extended cognitive systems.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 14(3), 577–598.
Heersmink, R. (2016). Distributed selves: Personal identity and extended memory systems. Synthese.
doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1102-4.
Heersmink, R., & Carter, J. A. (2017). The philosophy of memory technologies: Metaphysics, knowledge,
and values. Memory Studies. doi:10.1177/1750698017703810.
Huebner, B. (2011). Genuinely collective emotions. European Journal of Philosophy, 1(1), 89–118.
Hutchins, E. (1995a). Cognition in the wild. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hutchins, E. (1995b). How a cockpit remembers its speed. Cognitive Science, 19(3), 265–288.
Ihde, D. (1990). Technology and the lifeworld: From garden to earth. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York: Dover.
Jongepier, F. (2016). Towards a constitutive account of implicit narrativity. Phenomenology and the
Cognitive Sciences, 15(1), 51–66.
Kind, A. (2015). Persons and personal identity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Køster, A. (2016). Narrative and embodiment: A scalar approach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive
Sciences. doi:10.1007/s11097-016-9485-8.
Krueger, J. (2014). Varieties of extended emotion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13(4),
533–555.
Lindemann, L. (2001). Damaged identities, narrative repair. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Locke, J. (1979). An essay concerning human understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lupton, D. (2016). The quantified self: A sociology of self-tracking. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Mackenzie, C. (2014). Embodied agents, narrative selves. Philosophical Explorations, 17(2), 154–171.
Malafouris, L. (2008). Between brains, bodies and things: Tectonoetic awareness and the extended self.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 363, 1993–2002.
The narrative self, distributed memory, and evocative objects
123
McClelland, J., Rumelhart, D., & Hinton, G. (1986). The appeal of parallel distributed processing. In J.
McClelland & D. Rumelhart (Eds.), Parallel distributed processing (Vol. 2). Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Menary, R. (2007). Cognitive integration: Mind and cognition unbounded. London: Palgrave McMillan.
Menary, R. (2008). Embodied narratives. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15(6), 63–84.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1965). Phenomenology of perception. London: Routledge.
Michaelian, K., & Sutton, J. (2013). Distributed cognition and memory research: History and current
directions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4(1), 1–24.
Olson, E. T. (1997). The human animal: Personal identity without psychology. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Osborne, B. S. (2001). Landscapes, memory, monuments, and commemoration: Putting identity in its
place. Canadian Ethnic Studies, 33(3), 39–77.
Peirce, C. S. (1935). The collected papers of Charles S. Peirce (Vol. 3). Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Petrelli, D., & Whittaker, S. (2010). Family memories in the home: Contrasting physical and digital
mementos. Personal and Ubiquitous Computing, 14(2), 153–169.
Petrelli, D., Whittaker, S. & Brockmeier, J. (2008). Autotopography: What can physical mementos tell us
about digital memories? In Proceedings of CHI 2008 (pp. 53–62).
Robbins, P., & Aydede, M. (Eds.). (2008). The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Rowlands, M. (1999). The body in mind: Understanding cognitive processes. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Rowlands, M. (2010). The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Rupert, R. (2004). Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition. The Journal of Philosophy, 101(8),
389–428.
Schechtman, M. (1994). The truth about memory. Philosophical Psychology, 7(1), 3–18.
Schechtman, M. (1996). The constitution of selves. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Schechtman, M. (2005). Personal identity and the past. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 12(1),
9–22.
Shoemaker, S. (1984). Personal identity: A materialist’s account. In S. Shoemaker & R. Swinburne
(Eds.), Personal identity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Skorburg, J. A. (2017). Lessons and new directions for extended cognition from social and personality
psychology. Philosophical Psychology. doi:10.1080/09515089.2017.1282606.
Slaby, J. (2014). Emotions and the extended mind. In C. von Scheve & M. Salmela (Eds.), Collective
emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smart, P., Heersmink, R., & Clowes, R. (2017). The cognitive ecology of the internet. In S. Cowley & F.
Valle´e-Tourangeau (Eds.), Cognition beyond the brain: Computation, interactivity and human
artifice (2nd ed.). Dordrecht: Springer.
Stephan, A., Walter, S., & Wilutzky, W. (2014). Emotions beyond brain and body. Philosophical
Psychology, 27(1), 65–87.
Sterelny, K. (2010). Minds: Extended or scaffolded? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(4),
465–481.
Sutton, J. (2010). Exograms and interdisciplinarity: History, the extended mind, and the civilizing
process. In R. Menary (Ed.), The extended mind (pp. 189–225). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sutton, J., Harris, C. B., Keil, P., & Barnier, A. J. (2010). The psychology of memory, extended cognition,
and socially distributed remembering. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9, 521–560.
Theiner, G. (2013). Transactive memory systems: A mechanistic analysis of emergent group memory.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4(1), 65–89.
Turkle, S. (Ed.). (2007). Evocative objects: Things we think with. Cambridge: MIT Press.
van den Hoven, E. (2014). A future-proof past: Designing for remembering experiences. Memory Studies,
7(3), 373–387.
van Dijck, J. (2007). Mediated memories in the digital age. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Wegner, D. M. (1986). Transactive memory: A contemporary analysis of the group mind. In B. Mullen &
G. R. Goethals (Eds.), Theories of group behaviour (pp. 185–208). New York: Springer.
Wheeler, M. (2011). In search of clarity about parity. Philosophical Studies, 152(3), 417–425.
R. Heersmink
123
Wilson, R., & Clark, A. (2009). How to situate cognition: Letting nature take its course. In P. Robbins &
M. Aydede (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition (pp. 55–77). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, R., & Lenart, B. (2014). Extended mind and identity. In J. Clausen & N. Levy (Eds.), Handbook
of neuroethics (pp. 423–439). Dordrecht: Springer.
The narrative self, distributed memory, and evocative objects
123
